Replication is prevalent in both theory and practice as a means for obtaining robustness in distributed storage systems. A system in which every data entry is stored on two separate servers gives rise to a graph structure in a natural way, and the combinatorial properties of this graph shed light on the possible features of the system. One possible feature of interest, that has recently gained renewed attention, is private information retrieval (PIR). A PIR protocol enables a user to obtain a data entry from a storage system without revealing the identity of the requested entry to sets of colluding servers.
Abstract-Replication is prevalent in both theory and practice as a means for obtaining robustness in distributed storage systems. A system in which every data entry is stored on two separate servers gives rise to a graph structure in a natural way, and the combinatorial properties of this graph shed light on the possible features of the system. One possible feature of interest, that has recently gained renewed attention, is private information retrieval (PIR). A PIR protocol enables a user to obtain a data entry from a storage system without revealing the identity of the requested entry to sets of colluding servers.
In this paper we suggest a simple PIR protocol for graph based replication systems, which guarantees perfect secrecy against any set of colluding servers that does not induce a cycle. Furthermore, it is shown that the secrecy deteriorates gracefully with the number of cycles in the colluding set, and that the upload complexity can be reduced for graphs of certain specialized structure.
I. INTRODUCTION
Replication is possibly the simplest way of obtaining robustness against hardware failures in distributed storage systems. In spite of having high storage overhead and low failure resilience in comparison with more involved alternatives, replication systems often gain academic and industrial interest due to the their simplicity of analysis and implementation.
For integers n and f , and for a prime power q, consider a dataset x ∈ (F f q ) n as a collection of n files x 1 , . . . , x n , of length f each, over a finite field with q elements. Storing each file on two separate storage nodes gives rise to a graph G = (V, E). In this graph the nodes set V = [s] {1, . . . , s} is the set of servers, and two nodes are connected with an edge labeled by i ∈ [n] if the file x i is stored on both servers. Similar systems were studied in the past from various motivations [8] , [11] , [12] , [15] , [16] , but mainly as a mechanism for increasing the robustness of coded data. Furthermore, several real-life distributed file systems, such as Hadoop [7] and Cassandra [3] , employ this strategy if the replication factor parameter is set to two.
Independently, the interest in private information retrieval (PIR) protocols has increased lately due to the emergence of large scale storage systems and the growing concern for privacy in the digital era. Generally speaking, a PIR protocol enables a user to retrieve a file x i from a storage system which stores x, without revealing the value of i to small sets of colluding servers. Since its introduction in [4] , PIR has drawn an extensive amount of research from various scientific disciplines. In the classical setting, x consists of n bits that are replicated among two servers, and the user wishes to retrieve x i privately by communicating as few bits as possible.
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Numerous variants of the above problem were studied in the past, and many quantities of interest were addressed. For example, some quantities of interest include upload complexity (i.e., the size of the queries that are sent by the user), download complexity (i.e., the amount of information that is downloaded by the user), storage overhead (i.e., the amount of redundancy in the system), t-privacy (i.e., perfect secrecy against any set of t colluding servers), and so on.
Due to space constraints, a comprehensive list of previous works cannot be included herein. Yet, a few notable and recent contributions include the reduction of storage overhead by using error correcting codes in [5] and its improvement in [1] ; obtaining secrecy by one extra bit in [10] and its improvement in [2] ; the extensive line of works regarding capacity in [13] , [14] ; the inclusive approach of [6] , etc. Albeit this extensive body of work, it seems that the simple model which is discussed in this paper has never been studied before.
In what follows, a simple PIR protocol is given for the suggested model, which may be seen as a distributed variant of [4] , and operates over any field with at least three elements. Interestingly, it is shown that the privacy guarantee, i.e., the systems resilience against sets of colluding servers, is in strong correspondence with the girth of G (that is, the length of its shortest cycle). Furthermore, the information which is downloaded in order to privately obtain x i can also be used to obtain certain linear combinations of cut-sets of G (that is, sets of edges that connect some set of nodes S to its complement S c ).
One clear advantage of the resulting system is the graceful degradation of the guaranteed secrecy, i.e., sets of colluding servers that contain a cycle still cannot necessarily deduce the exact value of i. Instead, it is shown that they are able to deduce whether or not i belongs to any cycle which they induce, and nothing more; as a result, the full disclosure of i depends on intersection properties of cycles that contain the corresponding edge.
Finally, it is shown that for graphs of certain structure, the upload complexity may be significantly reduced. This method is also inspired by [4] , and construction of compatible graphs is given by using several group-theoretic notions.
II. PRELIMINARIES
The following problem statement refers to PIR protocols under any storage model, and not necessarily to graph based replication. In a PIR protocol, a dataset x, which consists of n files x 1 , . . . , x n , is distributed among s storage servers. A user that does not possess any information regarding the files wishes to obtain a file x i , where i is seen as chosen uniformly at random. The crux of the protocol is enabling the user to do so without revealing any information regarding i to any set of at most t colluding servers, where the integer t is the privacy parameter of the system.
To obtain x i , the user uses randomness in order to generate queries Q {q 1 , . . . , q s }, and sends q j to server j. In turn, each server j responds with an answer a j , that is a deterministic function of q j and of the content of the server. To maintain the correctness of the protocol, the user must be able to deduce the value of x i from the responses {a j } j∈ [s] .
For a set T ⊆ [s] of servers let Q T denote the random variable {q j } j∈T . To maintain t-privacy, i.e., to have complete secrecy of i from any set of t colluding servers, we must have that the random variables Q T and i are independent, for every T of size t. In this regard, the following lemma will be useful in the sequel. The upload complexity is j∈[s] |q j |, where |q j | denotes the length of the j-th query, measured by F q elements; and similarly, the download complexity is j∈[s] |a j |. The storage overhead is defined as the ratio between the total number of field elements stored in the system and the number of field elements in the dataset. Clearly, in graph based replication system the storage overhead is 2. Finally, the PIR rate of the system is the ratio between the download complexity and the size of the requested file. In all the schemes that are presented herein the PIR rate is 1/s.
In this paper we initiate a study about how replication based PIR protocols can be adapted to graph based storage systems; and which privacy guarantees result from this adaptation. Clearly, the immensity of contemporary data storage systems does not allow all data to be stored on one server. Our results shed light on the manner by which the data should be dispersed in order to increase privacy while maintaining low communication overhead.
Using straightforward replication is a special case of graphbased replication, where the underlying graph consists of two nodes that are connected by n parallel edges. Finally, this section is concluded with two famous examples of PIR protocols.
Example 1.
[4] For s = 2, any f , and any q, assume that each server stores the dataset x in its entirety. Upon requesting i, let q 1 be a random vector in F n q , and let q 2 = q 1 + e i , where e i is the i-th unit vector. The servers return the inner product a j = x · q j , and the user may extract x i by calculating a 2 − a 1 . Since q 1 is a purely random vector, it follows that this protocol is 1-private. The upload complexity is 2n, and the download complexity is 2.
Example 2. [4]
Let n be a square, and consider the dataset as an √ n × √ n matrix X. For s = 2, any f , and q = 2, assume that the servers store X in its entirety, and that the requested file is x ,r . The user chooses row vectors u, v ∈ F √ n q uniformly at random, sends q 1 (q 1,1 , q 1,2 ) = (u, v) to server 1, and q 2 (q 2,1 , q 2,2 ) = (u + e , v + e r ) to server 2. 1 The support of a random variable is the set of points in the probability space that are obtained with nonzero probability. In turn, server j responds with
where e 0 = 0. It is readily verified that by summing up the 0'th and the 'th bits from both servers, the user obtains x ,r . The suggested protocol is 1-private, incurs upload complexity of 4 √ n, and download complexity of 2 + 2 √ n.
III. GRAPH BASED PIR
Let G = (V, E) be an undirected d-regular graph with s nodes and n edges. In the suggested model n files are stored on s servers, and each server (node) stores the files (edges) that are incident with it. One possible PIR protocol for this model is as follows.
For simplicity we assume that the characteristic of the underlying field is 2. The scheme can be easily modified to accommodate for arbitrary characteristic. Upon requesting the i-th file the user constructs the following s × n query matrix
In this matrix, γ and v are randomly chosen vectors in (F * q ) s and (F * q ) n , respectively; I i is the s × n incidence matrix of the graph where one of its two 1 entries in the i-th column is replaced by a random element h ∈ F * q \ {1} (this is possible since q ≥ 3); and diag(·) is a square diagonal matrix that contains the given vector in its main diagonal.
Let q j , the query for server j, be the j-th row of Q. Clearly, to upload this row we only need to send the values of its d nonzero entries, and hence the total upload complexity is ds = 2n. Each node responds with a j = q j · x, and therefore the download complexity is sf = 2n d f . Note that node j can calculate the inner product since the support of q j contains only the indices of the files available to him. Upon receiving the information from all s servers, the user has access to diag(γ)I i diag(v)x, and then by multiplying from the left we get
where 1 is the all 1's vector, and hence x i can be recovered.
In fact, the following stronger theorem holds, whose proof is omitted, which states that certain linear combinations of {x j } j∈[n] may similarly be extracted from the same {a j } j∈ [s] . In what follows, let j ι , j τ ∈ [s] be the servers that store file i. Theorem 1. For S ⊆ [s] let r ∈ F n 2 be the characteristic vector of the cut-set R of the cut S × S c , and w.l.o.g. assume that j ι ∈ S. Then, the user is able to extract ((r + e i ) diag(v)) · x.
The special case S = [s], in which r = 0, reduces to the scheme which is described above. In addition, Theorem 1 implies that the user may extract x t for every t ∈ [n] \ {i} such that {i, t} is a cut-set.
The remainder of this section is dedicated to studying the collusion resilience of the suggested system. In what follows, for a set of servers S let G S be the subgraph of G that is induced by S. In addition, for a node set A ⊆ Proof. (sketch) According to Lemma 1, it suffices to prove that Pr(Q S = M ) is fixed for any M ∈ sup(Q S ) and any value of i. Given such M , fix a node j 0 ∈ S and choose an arbitrary value for γ j0 . Proceeding from j 0 in a BFS (Breadth First Search) traversal of G S , we have that each edge-node incidence has precisely one out of q − 1 possible values of some entry in either γ or v that results in the respective entry in M . Since S does not contain a cycle, no discrepancy is encountered, and we have that Pr(Q S = M ) = (q − 1) −|M | , where |M | is the number of nonzero entries of |M |. Since this value depends only on S and G, the claim follows.
We now turn to study how gracefully the perfect secrecy deteriorates in cases that are not covered by Proposition 1. Clearly, it follows from Theorem 1 that if L ⊆ [n] is a set of edges such that any two are a cut-set, then no set of colluding servers can infer the identity of i among L. However, such a set L is typically very small, or even empty. To study perfect secrecy degradation more carefully, the following lemma is given, and its proof is omitted. 
where C 1 , . . . , C are all cycles in G S that contain 2 i, and C 1 , . . . , C are all cycles in G S that do not contain i.
Proof. By Lemma 2, the colluding servers can compute the rank of Q S|C for every cycle C in their induced subgraph, and deduce if i ∈ C accordingly.
The following lemma shows that Corollary 1 is in some sense the best that the colluding servers can achieve. Formally, we show that if i is in G S , then all respective possible queries are obtained with identical probability. To this end, for a set S of servers let b be the number of back-edges in a BFS run of G S , i.e., edges that are not in the corresponding BFS forest. It is an easy exercise to show that b is identical for any possible run of the BFS algorithm.
Lemma 3. For a set S of colluding servers we have that
Proof. (sketch) Traverse G S in a BFS fashion, and assume that the i-th edge, if it resides on a cycle in S, is traversed last. As in the proof of Proposition 1, choose an arbitrary value for γ j0 , where j 0 is the starting vertex of the BFS algorithm, and observe that any subsequent edgenode incidence for a tree edge reduces the probability of obtaining M by (q − 1) −1 . For a back edge t it can be shown that there exist only q − 1 possible columns in M so that M ∈ sup(Q S |i ∈ T ), and respectively, only one choice of v t that produces this column. That is, back edges reduce the probability by (q − 1) −1 , as oppose to (q − 1) −2 for tree edges. This concludes the claim for sets S in which i is not on a cycle in G S .
If i is on a cycle in G S , we have that the final step of the algorithm is choosing values for v i and h such that
where the values of γ jι and γ jτ were determined in previous steps. Since h / ∈ {0, 1} and v i = 0, the claim follows for this case as well.
The following example shows that for a small number of servers, certain unique structures of G provide strong resilience against collusion.
Example 3. Let G be the Petersen graph, a 3-regular graph with 10 nodes, 15 edges, and girth 5. Applying the above protocol on G enables the storage of 15 files on 10 servers, 3 files on each, where any 4 servers cannot infer any information regarding i. According to the unique structure of the Petersen graph, at least 8 servers are required to infer the exact identity of i. The upload complexity is 30 field elements, and the download complexity is 10f field elements.
When the number of servers grows large, however, the optimal resilience against sets of colluding servers is obtained by a well-known family of graphs. Example 4. Ramanujan graphs (e.g., [9] ) with n edges and constant degree have girth O(log n). Hence, the system is resilient against any O(log n) colluders, but requires download of δnf field elements for some δ ∈ (0, 1).
IV. REDUCING THE UPLOAD COMPLEXITY
In cases where n f , one might require to decrease the upload complexity from 2n. Assume that n = m 2 for some integer m, and that the dataset is of the form X = (x s,t ) s,t∈ [m] ∈ (F f q ) m×m . Roughly speaking, in this section each server j stores a rectangle X(j) of X, i.e., a set of the form {x a,b } (a,b)∈Aj ×Bj for some A j , B j ⊆ [m]. Further, each query q j is an |A j | × |B j | matrix of rank one, that may be transmitted by using |A j | + |B j | field elements, and thus the overall upload complexity can be reduced. This approach is also strongly inspired by [4] (see Example 2) .
Let G = (V = R ∪ L, E) be a directed d-regular graph with s nodes and n = m 2 edges, and assume that there exists an injective edge labeling function :
where N j is the set of edges that are incident with node j.
Let R {R j × R j } j∈R and L {L j × L j } j∈L be the sets of rectangles that correspond to nodes in R and L, respectively. It follows from the definition that both R and L are rectangle covers of [m]×[m], i.e., each of them is a set of disjoint rectangles that cover [m] × [m]. Furthermore, it also follows from the definition that the size of the intersection between any rectangle from R and any rectangle from L is at most one. For simplicity, assume that the rectangles R j × R j and L j ×L j are of identical dimensions
. Graphs with such structure will be constructed in the sequel by using group-theoretic arguments.
To conveniently describe the following scheme, for h ∈ F * q and an integer j let 1 (h,j) be a vector, whose length is understood from the context, that contains 1 in all entries other than the j-th, and contains h in the j-th entry. Upon requesting x i,i ∈ F f q , the user chooses v, u ∈ (F * q ) m , γ ∈ (F * q ) s , and h ∈ F * q , all uniformly at random. To each node j ∈ R the user sends
seen as row vectors, where v| Rj (resp. u| R j ) denotes the index-preserving restriction 3 of v to R j (resp. u to R j ). To each node j ∈ L the user sends
Hence, the upload complexity is 2s √ d. In turn, server j responds with ρ j tr (q
where P (F * q \ {1}) × I j , and I j is either R j or L j , depending if j ∈ R or j ∈ L. Notice that the response from 3 That is, the entries of the shortened vector are seen as indexed by R j . server j consists of (1 + (q − 2) √ d) · f field elements 4 , and hence, the overall download complexity is (1+(q−2) √ d)·f s. To retrieve the file, the user computes
where ρ j,h,i = ρ j if i / ∈ R j (resp. L j ). By using the fact that R and L are rectangle covers, (2) can be shown to be equal to (h − 1) 2 v i u i x i,i . Therefore, the requested file can be obtained by dividing the result of the computation by (h − 1) 2 v i u i , which is nonzero.
We now turn to discuss the secrecy which is guaranteed by the system. First, notice that for any , j, k ∈ [m], the queries that are sent to the servers by a user that requires x ,k and a user that requires x j,k are identical. Hence, no set of colluding servers is able to infer any information regarding the row of the required file (i in the above scheme).
Yet, the secrecy of i is compromised for sets of colluding servers that contain a cycle. In what follows, a query q j = (q
is considered as a vector in F n q by identifying the entries of F n q with [m] × [m], placing the entries of q j in entries corresponding to R j × R j (resp. L j × L j ), and placing zeros in the remaining entries. Hence, we can consider the query matrix Q ∈ F s×n q in the same manner as in Section III. In addition, for a cycle C we say that i is on C if it contains an edge labeled by (k, i ) for some k ∈ [m]. Proof. If S contains a cycle C, it is readily verified that Q S|C is equivalent to a matrix of the form
if i is on C, and otherwise, it is equivalent to a matrix of the form 
Since G is bipartite, it follows that C is an even cycle, and hence (3) is invertible, whereas (4) is not. Hence, the servers in S can decide whether i is on C.
Conversely, by using a BFS technique as in Proposition 1, we show that
for any M ∈ sup(Q S ), where t | j∈S∩R R j ∪ j∈S∩L L j | and t | j∈S∩R R j ∪ j∈S∩L L j |. First, notice that any row of M corresponds to a √ d × √ d matrix of rank one and no zero entries. Hence, after fixing γ j for any j ∈ S ∩R, we have
that (v| Rj ) (u| R j ) yields row j in Q S . Thus, only q − 1 out of the (q − 1) 2 √ d options to choose (v| Rj , u| R j ) are suitable. Now, each newly discovered vertex j has only one possible value for γ j . Moreover, the intersection between the rectangles R j × R j and L j × L j fixes an entry of v and an entry of u in L j × L j (see Figure 2 ). Thus, the remaining entries of v| L j and u| L j have only one possible value. Hence, after fixing γ j (with probability 1) and its respective row (with probability (q − 1) 1−2 √ d ), each newly discovered vertex induces a multiplicative factor of (q − 1) −1 , and so does each newly discovered entry of v and u. Hence, if i / ∈ j∈S∩R R j ∪ j∈S∩L L j , then the probability of obtaining M is
On the other hand, if i ∈ j∈S∩R R j ∪ j∈S∩L L j then the respective arguments are identical, replacing u i by hu i .
The above arguments can be generalized to any n = n 1 n 2 with n 1 = n 2 , and non-uniform rectangle sizes. Consequently, a general family of suitable graphs is obtained from the following group-theoretic claim, whose proof is omitted.
Lemma 5. Let H and K be trivially intersecting subgroups of a group G. Then, for every a and b in G, the set aH ∩ bK contains at most one element.
Example 5. Let H = H 1 × H 2 and K = K 1 × K 2 be two trivially intersecting subgroups of a group G = G 1 ×G 2 . Define a bipartite graph G = (L ∪ R, E) with L = G/H and R = G/K, and draw an edge between every pair of cosets that intersect. To see that the set of neighbors of each node is indeed a rectangle in G 1 × G 2 , note that by Lemma 5, each intersection is of size at most one, and hence each edge can be labeled by a unique element of G 1 ×G 2 . Hence, since cosets of a subgroup cover the entire group, it follows that N (aH) = aH and N (bK) = bK for every a and b in G.
Thus, n 1 = |G 1 |, n 2 = |G 2 |, and for all j, |R j | = |H 1 |, |R j | = |H 2 |, |L j | = |K 1 |, |L j | = |K 2 |. Further, we have that s = |G|/|H| + |G|/|K| servers store n = |G| files of arbitrary size f , and the upload and download complexities are |G| ((|H 1 | + |H 2 |)/|H| + (|K 1 | + |K 2 |)/|K|) and f (s + |G|(q − 2)(|H 1 |/|H| + |K 1 |/|K|)),
respectively.
As a preliminary instance of Example 5, one may consider G 1 = G 2 = Z pp , where p and p are distinct primes, and the subgroups H = Z p × Z p and K = Z p × Z p . In the resulting systems we have (pp ) 2 files in 2pp servers, and the respective protocol is 3-private.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper two simple PIR protocols are suggested for systems which employ graph based replication. Since these results stem from ideas for classical PIR, it is interesting to see if more involved PIR protocols in the classical model can be adapted to our model, and at what cost. Furthermore, even though our model is compatible with many real-life storage systems, a replication factor of three is often more prevalent, and requires a more careful analysis by using hypergraphs. 
